When a public good is excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. We study the role of prices on excludable public goods within an extension of the SternStiglitz version of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model. Our discussion includes both the case where the public good is a final consumer good and the case where it is an intermediate good.
Introduction
In many countries there is growing concern about the size of public budgets and a search for alternatives to tax funding. Since excludable public goods are by definition such that it is poss ible to charge a price or fee for their use, even the well established case for free provision of public goods is being challenged in the case of excludable public goods. In this paper we shall address the provision of such goods.
There are many important examples of excludable public goods. Information is in general a public good and often it can be made excludable. Patent rights is one way to exclude. For information that is only of value in the fairly short term, like meteorological and hydrological forecasts, it would probably be easy to exclude people and only let those who subscribe to the service have access to the information. The services provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics is another example of information that can easily be made excludable. Radio and television broadcasts, many services provided on the internet and non-congested roads, public beaches, national parks and museums are some other examples of excludable public goods.
There are several questions that are of interest to study. First, if there is public provision, should it then be financed by an income tax or should it be partly, or completely, financed by a fee (price).
3 If the price instrument is indeed used, will this lead to more or less provision of the public good as compared to the situation without exclusion ? Second, since it is possible to have market provision of excludable public goods by private firms, there is the important issue of whether public or private provision is preferable. Third, some excludable public goods can be regarded as final consumer goods. However, goods, like statistics or other information, have more the character of an intermediate good. It is conceivable that the rules for provision would depend on whether the excludable public good is a final consumer good or an intermediate good. We will not attempt to answer all these questions. We will focus on public provision of an excludable public good. However, we will consider both the case where the public good is a final consumer good and the case where it is an intermediate public good. In either case the central issue is the welfare effect of charging a price.
Empirically there are examples both of publicly provided, excludable public goods being financed from general tax revenue and goods partly financed by prices.
Weather forecasts are in many countries publicly provided and financed out of general tax revenue. Many forms of statistics are publicly provided and financed out of general tax revenue. However, there are examples, like Sweden, where recently substantial charges have been introduced for users to get access to Central Bureau of Statistics data.
There is a vast literature on public and/or private provision of nonexcludable public goods. However, public provision of excludable public goods has not been much studied. Of course, the first best rule does not depend on whether the public good is excludable or not. In a second best setting it may be different since there is one more instrument, a price on the public good, available when the public good is excludable. Fraser (1996) studied provision of excludable public goods. However, in his model the incomes are exogenous and there are no distortions from the income tax. There are several papers that have studied market provision of excludable public goods by private firms. Oakland (1974) studied a model where private firms operating under conditions of perfect competition provide an excludable public good. Brito and Oakland (1980) and Burns and Walsh (1981) consider a situation where a na tural monopoly provide an excludable public good.
We believe it is important to acknowledge that taxes are not only used in order to finance public goods but also to achieve redistribution. We therefore use an extension of the Stiglitz-Stern version of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model. 4 We will assume there are two types of persons, high-skilled and low-skilled, and that it is desireable to redistribute from the high-skilled to the low-skilled. First considering the case where the public good is a final consumer good, we formulate the optimisation problem in section 2, and then discuss the optimum price setting and public provision in section 3. The focus of that section is on the conditions under which non-zero prices would be part of the optimal provision scheme. In section 4 we consider the case where the public good is an intermediate good. Section 5 concludes.
3 One benefit of using prices to finance an excludable public good is that data will be generated that might be useful to derive the users' evaluation of the public good. In the analysis below we will not take this aspect into account. Hence, we will assume that individuals' preferences are known. 4 See Mirrlees (1971) , Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) . q g . The effective demand is given by: back into the direct utility function we obtain the conditional
Turning to the social optimisation problem, our concern will be with (information constrained) Pareto efficient policy. Even if our focus be on the optimal price of the public good, we have to analyse the price setting within a wider optimisation problem that also involves income taxes. We assume a linear production technology and denote the producer price of the public good by p . Let N denote the number of type one and type two individuals, respectively. We assume 1 2 w w > , and that the social planner wants to redistribute from the high-skilled to the low-skilled type. In pursuing such a policy the planner will face an asymmetric information constraint. We assume that 
. 7 We may note that
It is also helpful to note that we can write the identity of the two types is private information that is hidden to the planner. Thus the policy must be chosen subject to the restriction that incomes intended for type one do not accrue to type two individuals pretending to be of type one. 8 There is no reason to assume that there are systematic differences in preferences between high skill and low skill persons. Differences in demand for the public good depend only on differences in leisure (work effort) and income. We will explore the Pareto efficient allocations by maximising the utility of person of type one for a given utility level of type two persons.
The optimization problem, which defines Pareto efficient taxation and provision of the public good, takes the form:
The constraint (2) assigns a minimum utility level to individuals of type two. . In the analysis below we will also assume that q must be nonnegative. The government budget cons traint is expressed by (4). It requires that revenue from income taxes and from charging a price on the public good is sufficient to finance the public good provision.
3. Optimum price setting and public good provision.
Before deriving the first order conditions for the optimization problem we can establish that it will never be optimal to choose a combination of price and provision such that no individual consumes the total amount of the public good. and q. We note that the problem formally has strong similarities with both the optimal commodity tax problem and the publicly provided private goods problem, but it is clearly a separate problem. The first order conditions are the following:
The requirement that q is nonnegative implies that there might not exist a meaningful
However, considering a case where the optimal value of q is determined by an interior solution to 0 / = ∂ Λ ∂ q we get:
We note that eqs. (5) - (8) and (10) formally look the same as in Edwards et al. (1994) .
However, note that there is only a formal similarity. In the present context individuals 8 may be rationed and q must be nonnegative. This also means that we have to be careful when interpreting the first order conditions.
Making use of Roy's identity 10 and the Slutsky equation; we can rewrite (10) as
We then make use of (5) and (7) to eliminate terms:
where
The expression in brackets on the left-hand side of (14) is the sum of substitution effects, which is non-positive.
Equation (14) expresses a trade -off between two effects. Consider the case in which the demand for g is decreasing in labour and accordingly increasing in leisure
). If type one is not rationed ) ( 1 g g < , the mimicker, enjoying more leisure, will be the larger buyer of g ) ( 1 m g g < , and the price q can be used to relax the self-selection constraint. By increasing q and lowering the income tax to make person one equally well off, the mimicker, incurring a larger real income loss from the price increase, will be made worse off and the self-selection constraint (3) is being relaxed. This effect is reflected by the right hand side of (14). This effect has to be traded off against the effect 10 From Roy's identity we know that
Finally, w e also use the Slutsky decomposition
, where we use the superscript h to denote the Hicksian demand. on the left hand side which is the the distortionary effect of pricing the public good in a way which drives the consumption below the available amount of g.
We shall now identify and characterise the respective optima of the various regimes that can materialise. In characterising different regimes it will be crucial how leisure, or labor supply, affects the marginal valuation of 
leisure can have a positive effect on the marginal valuation of g and induce a higher demand, or the effect can be zero or negative. For example more leisure can increase the marginal benefit of television programmes and make watching television more attractive.
The case with 0 L = g occurs if the direct utility function exhibits weak separability between leisure and market goods.
For the case of a zero or negative impact of leisure we can show the following result:
Proposition 2: Nothing can be gained by a positive price on the excludable public good
To prove this proposition we will consider each of the cases i. B with the amount qg . The situation for the actual persons will be unchanged.
However, the mimicker will be hurt, so the self-selection constraint will slacken and there is room for a Pareto improvement. d)
. In this case both actual persons and the mimicker are constrained. q is indeterminate by reasoning similar to that under i.
We deduce that nothing can be gained by having a positive price.
It follows from Proposition 2 that only if
can the economic situation be improved by using the price instrument. However, as will be shown below this is a necessary, not a sufficient condition.
. Then there is no gain (or loss) from introducing a positive price as long as both types of persons remain rationed.
Proof : For q such that g g i ≤ is strictly binding for both types of persons, the mimicker is also rationed since 0 > i L g , the compensated price derivatives are zero, and it follows immediately from (13) that 0 / = ∂ Λ ∂ q .
Proposition 4 :
and that both persons are constrained up to price q . Then, marginally increasing the price so that the quantity constraint of one type ( g g i ≤ ) is just being relaxed, will make the allocation strictly less efficient.
Proof :
Suppose it is the quantity constraint for type i that is being relaxed first as the price increases. Then, from eq. (13) we see that the change in welfare is given by
It is of interest to compare this result with a corresponding result from the optimal commodity tax literature. Had the good in question been an ordinary private good x
it would have been optimal to introduce a small tax on the good. (See e.g. Christiansen (1984) ). This is because in the optimal commodity tax case, at a zero tax the size of the deadweight loss from a marginal tax would be of second order, whereas the benefits from the slackening of the self -selection constraint would be a first order effect. For a publicly provided excludable public good it is the other way around.
Since the marginal cost of providing one more unit o f g to a person is zero as long as the person is not constrained, the price in our model resembles a tax. However, in
, there would be a range of the price where there is neither a gain nor a loss from having a positive price. This holds as long as both persons are constrained.
Then a further increase in q that results in the quantity constraint being relaxed for one type of person leads to a decrease in welfare due to the deadweight losses created by the price. This is quite different from the optimal commodity tax result and is due to the fact that we, as q is marginally increased above q , come from a regime where the individuals are constrained. Looking at eq. (13) and an increase in q penalizes the mimicker more than it hurts the low-skilled person. It is then possible that the gain from slackening the self -selection constraint outweighs the deadweight losses.
We can then identify the possible optima.
the optimum can be of one of the following types : i. Persons of type one are not ratione d in their demand for the excludable public good and a strictly positive price on the good is desirable. Persons of type two may or may not be rationed.
ii. Both types of persons are rationed in their demand for the excludable public good and q assumes any value in the interval {0, q } where q is the price at which the rationing constraint ceases to bind. Thus we have an infinite number of equivalent optima.
It is not possible to have an optimum at which only type one is rationed because then, from (13), 0 / 2 2
. Either type one is not rationed or both types are rationed. If type one is not rationed it follows from (14) that q is positive since the right hand side is then negative and the compensated price derivative appearing on the left hand side is also negative. If both types are rationed, the first order condition that 0 / = ∂ Λ ∂ q holds for the given price interval according to proposition 3.
We note that under the conditions of the model the price is within certain limits arbitrary. However, there is also an administrative cost of collecting a price which in practice will rule out indifference between a zero and a non-zero price.
Combining proposition 4 and proposition 5 we note that a regime with a price that prevents rationing must be characterised by a price which is set discretely above the price at which the rationing constraint ceases to bind. Let us see how this may happen.
Consider the case described in propositio n 4. Departing from the price q and then increasing the price will at first reduce efficiency as stated by proposition 4. But as q is increased and the g-consumption of person 1 declines a discrepancy between 1 g and m g will occur. This discrepancy makes it possible to use the price q as a device for relaxing the self-selection constraint. On the other hand increasing q will discourage the consumption of g and distort the allocation. In order to obtain an efficiency gain from increasing q above q , the benefits from softening the self -selection constraint must not only outweigh the cost of further distortions beyond some point, but it must also outweigh the latter by a margin which offsets the initial loss from increasing q. In this sense one may argue that there is a relatively weak case for regime i of proposition 5.
We may also note that the two effects discussed above are not entirely independent. One way that an increase in q may strongly discourage the consumption of g by person one and thus create a discrepancy between 1 g and m g is through a strong substitution effect, but this will also add to the consumption distortion and thus create a countervailing deadweight loss.
It follows from our results that the welfare level can follow three different types of paths as q is being increased. These are depicted in the figures 1a-c below. We illustrate how the welfare of individual one cha nges with the level of q, keeping the utility of person 2 constant. As q is increased beyond a certain level efficiency declines and may never rise again ( fig. 1a) . For other properties of the economy efficiency may start picking up again at some level of q, but may never fully recover, and keeping q sufficiently low is optimal ( fig. 1b) . Only in the last case (fig 1c) does optimality require a strictly positive price. In this case the benefits of the slackening of the self-selection constraint outweigh the inefficiencies as captured by the substitution effects. In a companion paper (Blomquist and Christiansen (2001) ) we have examined further the conditions that are conducive to a strictly positive price as illustrated in Fig.   1c . We find that on the whole strong income and labour effects and weak substitution effects on the demand for 1 g as well as comparatively flat indifference curves for the mimicker in Y,B-space are conducive to the outcome in Fig. 1c . Such conditions will ensure that 1 g declines strongly in the former interval where utility is decreasing so that one gets to a position where the slackening of the self-selection constraint starts to dominate without sacrificing too much utility on the way. They will also imply that utility increases strongly beyond the local utility minimum.
We next consider the rule for the optimal quantity of public good provison. To accomplish this we rewrite eq. (10) 
Adding and subtracting
, we obtain:
Using eqs. (6) and (8) we rewrite this as: 
From section 2 we know that
which is zero if the person is not rationed.
Inserting this result and dividing through by µ and rearranging we obtain:
We now consider the interpretation of (19) and the q-terms will cancel out. Hence, the q-terms will always disappear from the expression. However, the self-selection term remains. 
Persons of both types and consequently the mimicker are rationed (< ). The public provision rule has the form ) ( 
Then there can only be a loss from increasing g. However, it is possible to reduce g by one unit, which will imply that both types of persons and the mimicker have to reduce consumption by one unit, and the production cost is reduced
11
. Optimality requires that there is no net from such a cutback as prescribed by the optimality condition above.
The intuition for the results above is pretty straightforward in most cases. There is a gain from deviating from the Samuelson rule if by doing so one succeeds in relaxing the self-selection constraint. This will happen if the low -ability person and the mimicker behave differently and can be discriminated between. If the mimicker, enjoying more leisure, has a lower marginal valuation of g as in Proposition 7, the public good should be oversupplied compared to the Samuelson rule. Suppose that departing from the Samuelson optimum, an additional unit of g is supplied. The high-and low-ability persons are charged through their tax liabilities to be left equally well off. Then the mimicker is made worse off as his lower valuation of g does not compensate for the tax increase. Mimicking is being deterred. However, if the mimicker's valuation exceeds that of the low-ability person the mimicker will gain from a tax-paid increase in g, but will be made worse off if g is decreased. Hence g should be undersupplied relative to the Samuelson rule as prescribed by Proposition 8 ii-iv.
If they have the same valuation of g, as in Proposition 6, a change in the supply of g and compensating tax changes will not discriminate between the two. Nothing can be gained by deviating from the Samuelson rule as stated by Proposition 6.
A special case arises when the low-ability type is not rationed. Then an increase in the provision of g will not affect the consumption of this type and the sum of marginal benefits of increasing g is equal to the sum taken solely across type two individuals. If the low ability type and the mimicker are both left unaffected by an increase in g, no discrimination of the mimicker can be achieved, we have a special case of the Samuelson rule as in case i of Proposition 8. If relaxing the mimicking constraint is possible case ii gives us a special case iii in Proposition 8.
Excludable intermediate public goo d
We shall consider the same two-type, asymmetric information model as above with the following qualifications. An excludable public good is used as an intermediate good in the production sector, but there is no public good in the consumption bundle.
There are two consumer goods. We assume that each good is provided by producers, each producing a fixed quantity normalised to unity. Let i c be the labour cost in efficiency units per unit output of commodity i. The unit cost is assumed to be a function of the amount of the public good being used in the production of that commodity. The idea is that the use of the public good makes production more efficient and economizes on the use of labour. 12 We assume there is free entry and exit of firms. Hence, the quantities produced of the two consumption goods vary as the number of firms varies.
Assuming that each producer has a fixed output is a simplifying assumption. If a producer could make any acquired amount of g available at no further cost to all parts of the production, there would be economies of scale in production. Concentrating production would economise on the cost of acquiring the public good. However, there may be other disadvantages from having large production units, but with the cost of acquiring g still being one determinant of the optimum size. We do not want to model these various factors, which would take us far beyond the focus of our discussion. We observe that there are sectors with many producers making use of public goods in their production, and we want to consider such a setting without modeling too many details of the production structure.
The producer will minimize the unit cost of production including the cost of
, implying that in the case of an interior solution
12 An alternative perspective would be to assume that the effect of g is to raise the quality of the goods being produced rather than to lower their production cost. Essentially this is the same thing because producing higher quality at the same cost can be perceived as producing a larger amount at the same cost, which is equivalent to a lower cost per unit. 
A necessary condition for a Pareto efficient allocation is that it is impossible to use the instruments of the government in such a way that both types of persons are kept equally well off while the government revenue is increased. If that were possible the additional revenue could be used to increase the disposable income of the high-skilled person. The self-selection constraint would not be violated and a Pareto improvement would be obtained. We will now focus on such necessary conditions, which will allow us to draw some important conclusions about price setting without going through a detailed optimisation with respect to all the instruments of the model above.
We do the following exercise. We consider changes in q and g. At the same time we keep the gross and net incomes of both types of persons unchanged and adjust the commodity taxes in such a way that the consumer prices of both goods remain the same.
Then obviously both types of persons stay equally well off, the mimicking constraint remains satisfied and demand for the consumer goods is left unchanged. We can then concentrate on the effect on government revenue.
Pegging the consumer prices at fixed values 1 p and 2 p the commodity taxes are restricted by
The necessary adjustments in response to changes in q and g are given by
Let us then explore how the government revenue is affected by changing q and g subject to the constraint imposed above. Taking net and gross incomes and hence the income tax revenue as fixed we focus on the net revenue from g and commodity taxes 
Either the producer is not rationed, and the price is zero (such that 0
The optimum amount of g is characterised by the first order condition 
We know from above that that q=0 or producers are rationed. If q=0 and there is no rationing also 0 = ′ i c and (33) does not hold. Hence we realise that producers in both sectors are rationed, or one producer is rationed and one producers is at a satiation point
. For a rationed producer 1 / = dg dg i .
We can conclude that 
which holds with at least one rationed producer. We note that the gain from using an extra unit of g in the production of good i is a cost saving per unit equal to ' If for some reason the desirable commodity taxes are not available there may be a case for achieving some of the same effect through a policy that violates production efficiency. Suppose it is desirable to increase the price of a commodity, and imposing a tax is not feasible. Then by making production in that sector less efficient, the price can be increased, but at the expense of production efficiency. However, we shall refrain from further analysis of such a regime.
Concluding remarks
We have used the Stiglitz-Stern model to study the respective conditions under which it is useful or harmful to set a positive price on a publicly provided excludable public good.
As in the optimal commodity tax literature we find that the potential role of a price is to discourage the high-skilled person from mimicking. Therefore, whether the price instrument should be used or not hinges on how the evaluation of the public good depends on the amount of leisure which is the only feature of consumption distinguishing the high-skilled mimicker from the low-skilled persons. We first consider the case where the excludable public god is a final consumer good. We find that it can be gainful to use the price instrument only if the demand for the excludable public good increases with the amount of leisure. The reason why it may be beneficial in this case is that the mimicker has a larger consumption of the excludable public good and is hurt more than a lowskilled person by a price on the public good. As such this is not a surprising result.
However, the positive leisure impact is not a sufficient condition for this outcome. Only if the demand for the excludable public good increases in leisure and the optimum is such that the low-skilled person is not rationed is it desirable to set a positive price on the public good. A finding, which is somewhat surprising on intuitive grounds is that even when a strictly positive price is optimal, introducing a positive but too low price may be harmful compared to charging no price at all (even when we neglect the administrative cost of charging a price). We also characterize how the Samuelson rule is modified depending on how the demand for the public good varies with the amount of leisure.
We have studied the case where the excludable public good is an intermediate good in a framework where optimal commodity taxes on the consumer goods are available. Given the optimal use of these instruments we find that nothing can be gained by using the quantity of the public good or the price on the public good for deterring mimicking. The rule for determining the quantity of the public good implies production efficiency.
When a public good is excludable private firms could provide the good. Such provision has been studied in Brito and Oakland (1980) and Burns and Walsh (1981) .
They study the case where there is a natural monopoly. Oakland (1974) studied the case where the provision is from firms operating under conditions of perfect competition. Both forms of provision involve inefficiencies. In the monopoly case we know that the quantity in general tends to be too low. In the case with perfect competition the fact that there must be a large number of firms means that the public good will not be produced under conditions that take full advantage of the fact that it is a public good. However, also the public provision scheme involves inefficiencies. It would therefore be of interest to compare public provision and provision from private firms. However, we leave that for future research.
